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Introduction 
Over the past twenty years or so, the topic of so-called global justice has become the 
centre of much philosophical theorizing and debate. Up to this day, the debate has 
been somewhat polarized between cosmopolitan and anti-cosmopolitan views. The 
former are characterized by a commitment to extending domestic egalitarian 
principles of justice to the world at large. The latter, by contrast, deny that distributive 
equality is a value to be pursued at the global level, and opt for global sufficiency 
instead. At least that is how the debate is often characterised. 
 Both cosmopolitans and their opponents see themselves as operating within a 
broadly liberal normative framework. That is, they both believe that the moral 
principles they advocate represent the best articulation of a liberal political morality, 
based on the moral equality of persons qua rational and autonomous agents.i 
Cosmopolitans hold that persons’ moral equality demands global equality; anti-
cosmopolitans believe that such moral equality is compatible with equality 
domestically and ‘sufficiency’ internationally.  
 Although the debate between these two views is described as one about 
justice, surprisingly, relatively little attention has been given to what this description 
entails. In particular, very few participants in this debate explicitly acknowledge that 
principles of justice differ from other types of moral concerns in that they establish 
rightfully enforceable entitlements. Taking the lead from this observation, in this 
chapter I show that thinking of justice in terms of enforceable entitlements puts 
pressure on some popular cosmopolitan claims. In particular, I argue that, once justice 
is linked to rightful enforceability, it becomes much harder for cosmopolitans to 
defend full-blown global egalitarianism. By taking seriously the idea that principles of 
justice set out enforceable entitlements, cosmopolitans are thus pushed closer to, 
though still at some distance from, the views defended by their opponents. My 
argument can be helpfully presented in the form of a trilemma. 
 
a. Justice is rightfully enforceable. 
b. Justice demands global equality. 
c. Global equality (qua global equality) is not rightfully enforceable. 
 
If justice is rightfully enforceable, but global equality is not, then it follows that 
global equality is not a demand of justice, contrary to what cosmopolitans maintain.  
 The chapter is structured as follows. In section 1, I offer some preliminary 
observations on the nature of justice as a special kind of moral concern, thereby 
elucidating Claim a in the trilemma. In section 2, I focus on Claim b, and outline the 
main features of cosmopolitan justice. In sections 3 and 4, I defend Claim c. I first 
provide some intuitive evidence to the effect that cosmopolitanism does not offer a 
plausible account of rightfully enforceable entitlements at the global level. I then 
supplement this intuitive evidence with a systematic defence of the claim that global 
egalitarian principles are not rightfully enforceable and therefore not genuine 
principles of justice. I argue that, since global equality is reasonably contested as an 
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interpretation of equal respect, its demands cannot be imposed on dissenting parties 
without thereby violating equal respect (i.e. justice) itself. Under these circumstances, 
at least part of what justice requires must be established through fair decision-making 
procedures expressing equal respect for all. In section 5, I offer a tentative sketch of 
what global justice so understood requires. If I am right, taking the enforceability of 
justice seriously leads us to advocate global sufficiency at the level of outcomes, and 
global equality at the level of procedures, thereby steering a middle course between 
cosmopolitanism and its opponents. In section 6, I consider an objection to this newly 
developed perspective, and then conclude with some broader reflections on the 
implications of this approach for thinking about global justice. 
 
1. Claim a: Justice and Rightful Enforceability  
The notion of justice appears to occupy a special place in contemporary political 
philosophy. No doubt this is partly due to it being the pivotal concept in Rawls’s 
seminal book A Theory of Justice. But more generally, the centrality of justice in 
political philosophy, including in Rawls’s book, has much to do with its special nature 
as a type of moral concern. Justice is certainly one value among others, including 
friendship, courtesy, charity, and so forth. All of these values generate duties, thereby 
binding the conduct of agents vis-à-vis one another. Duties of justice, however, are 
distinctive in that, unlike duties of friendship or duties of charity, they generate 
rightfully enforceable entitlements.ii By this I mean entitlements which may be 
enforced without wrongdoing, independently of the actual availability of agents who 
are willing to enforce them. 
 To appreciate the special nature of justice, consider the differences between 
the following three cases. 
 
Charity: Bob has just stopped at a gas station to re-fuel his car, when he sees a man, 
John, sitting on the street and looking desperate. Bob approaches John and expresses 
concern for his condition. John reacts by telling Bob what has happened to him. After 
being left by his beloved girlfriend, John went to Las Vegas, where he ended up 
gambling all of his belongings away. He used to be perfectly well-off, but he now has 
nothing left: no partner, no money, no car, no house. Moved by John’s predicament, 
Bob decides to help him by giving him five hundred dollars.    
 
Friendship: Janice is about to go out partying with some colleagues, when one of her 
closest friends, Mary, calls her in tears: her boyfriend has left her. Mary, who has 
been a loyal friend to Janice over many years, is at home alone, sobbing away. Under 
those circumstances, Janice no longer feels it would be appropriate to go out partying. 
She excuses herself with her colleagues and tries to comfort Mary instead. 
 
Justice: Alfred has purchased a valuable clock from an antiques shop. He turns up to 
the shop with the intention of collecting his purchase, but the shop manager, Bill, 
pretends to have no recollection of the transaction. Alfred insists that he is now 
rightfully entitled to that clock, and that Bill ought to comply with his contractual 
obligations. 
 
Let us briefly analyse these different scenarios. In the first one, Bob may be said to 
act out of a duty of charity to help the needy when this can be done at reasonable 
costs. This duty, however, is not correlative to a right, and neither is it rightfully 
enforceable. John, the reckless gambler, has no right against Bob to any sum of 
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money, and it would certainly be wrong for the state or for John himself to force Bob 
to contribute the five hundred dollars he independently decides to donate.  
 In the second scenario, Janice may be said to act out of a duty of friendship. 
Mary, the friend who has supported Janice so many times over the years, is in need of 
help, and it is Janice’s duty, qua friend, to help her. In fact, we might even say that 
Mary has a right to be helped by Janice. Mary does not have a right to be consoled by 
her neighbours (who have just moved in), or by the shop assistant in the department 
store next door, and so forth. However, she does seem to have a right to be comforted 
by her friend Janice. Still, this right is certainly not enforceable. We would regard it 
as absurd if the state, or Mary herself, tried to enforce it. Doing so would be self-
defeating. Spontaneity, and a genuine concern for the other, are the very building 
blocks of friendship. 
 Now consider the third scenario. Here Alfred has a right to the antique clock, 
and Bill a duty to give it to him. Moreover, if Bill refuses to hand the clock to Alfred, 
Alfred may legitimately ask the state (particularly the police) to enforce his right. 
Since the clock is Alfred’s property, failing to give it to Alfred would be to commit 
theft. Respect for property rights is one of the cornerstones of justice, and precisely 
the sort of thing which the state may rightfully enforce.iii 
 The idea that principles of justice set out rightfully enforceable entitlements, 
intuitively illustrated with the three examples above, has a distinguished pedigree in 
political philosophy. Thinkers like Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill have 
defended it, as well as a number of contemporary scholars, including John Rawls and 
Robert Nozick.iv Indeed, despite their considerable substantive differences, both of 
Rawls’s and Nozick’s theories of (domestic) justice are meant to set out principles 
which may be rightfully enforced by the state. As Brian Barry eloquently says, 
‘[p]olitical philosophy is not about what we think it may be nice for people to do but 
what, at any rate in principle, they can be made to do.’v In line with this, justice, 
arguably the key concept within political philosophy, tells us what people can, in 
principle, ‘be made to do’.  
 It is important to note that the link between justice and rightful enforceability 
stems directly from liberalism’s commitment to persons’ autonomy. As I mentioned 
at the outset, liberals endorse the principle of equal respect for persons qua rational 
and autonomous agents. From a liberal point of view, a social system can be said to 
honour equal respect, if and only if each member possesses a space of choice within 
which to pursue her ends and goals without being interfered with by others. That is, 
the social order must be so designed as to allow each to enjoy the necessary social 
conditions to lead autonomous lives. Principles of justice are meant set out what these 
conditions are. If an agent fails to act on those principles, i.e. if he/she fails to respect 
others’ space of choice, it is rightful to curtail his/her autonomy by forcing him/her to 
comply with what justice demands. The limits on autonomy imposed by enforcement 
are justified as a means of defending autonomy itself.vi    
 Given the role of justice as protector of liberalism’s master-value, i.e. persons’ 
autonomy, and given its rightful enforceability, its prominence within debates about 
international morality should come as no surprise. This leads me to analyse Claim b, 
namely the cosmopolitan account of justice.  
  
2. Claim b: Cosmopolitan Justice as Global Equality 
In the present chapter, by ‘cosmopolitanism’ I indicate the view that the egalitarian 
principles of justice which liberals believe apply at the domestic level should also 
apply to the world at large. There are, of course, different variants of cosmopolitanism 
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so conceived, depending on (i) what particular type of distributive criterion 
cosmopolitans endorse and (ii) what particular unit of distribution they favour. For 
instance, some might adopt a Rawlsian approach and defend strict equality in relation 
to basic liberties and opportunities, and maximin with respect to income and wealth. 
Others, by contrast, might opt for some version of so-called responsibility-sensitive 
egalitarianism or luck-egalitarianism, and contend that ‘global’ disadvantage is just 
when it is traceable to choice, but unjust (hence in need of rectification) when it is 
traceable to circumstances outside an agent’s control.vii In turn, the idea of 
‘advantage’ may be cashed out in terms of welfare, of opportunity for welfare, or of a 
combination of welfare and material resources and so forth.viii What characterizes the 
cosmopolitan position, at any rate, is a broad commitment to global egalitarianism, 
understood as a demand of justice, stemming from the moral equality of persons. For 
cosmopolitans, justice consists in the realization of a certain end-state distributive 
pattern at the global level. 
 This broad description of cosmopolitanism encompasses both so-called 
relational and non-relational cosmopolitans.ix The former argue that egalitarian justice 
is triggered by the existence of special kinds of relations between people, and that 
these relations now exist on a global scale.x The latter, by contrast, consider global 
equality a direct implication of equal respect, independently of the existence of global 
structured interaction or cooperation.xi For present purposes we need not worry about 
these finer-grained differences, but can simply focus on the cosmopolitan (i.e. global 
egalitarian) position broadly construed.  
 Before moving on, let me respond to those who might question my definition 
of cosmopolitanism. Equating cosmopolitanism with global egalitarianism, they 
might say, is misleading. Cosmopolitanism is instead best defined in terms of a 
general commitment to persons’ being fundamental objects of moral concern.xii 
Would this not be a more general and charitable description of this view? It would 
not. This is because anti-cosmopolitans also insist that they are committed to the 
moral equality of persons. Their claim is precisely that this moral equality allows for a 
differentiated system of moral obligations: more demanding at home (i.e. egalitarian), 
less demanding globally (typically sufficientarian).xiii More illuminating, I believe, is 
a definition of cosmopolitanism in line with its etymology. ‘Cosmopolitan’ means 
‘citizen of the world’, and suggests the existence of a world-large polity (from a moral 
point of view) to which principles of domestic justice should apply. Since, within 
liberal quarters, such principles are egalitarian in form, a cosmopolitan view demands 
the extension of distributive equality to the world at large.xiv   
 Having clarified the nature of cosmopolitan justice, I now turn to Claim c. 
 
3. Claim c: Cosmopolitan Justice and Rightful Enforceability—The Intuitive 
Argument  
If my claims about the nature of justice as setting out rightfully enforceable 
entitlements are correct, then we must conclude that, for cosmopolitans, equality (of 
whichever form) ought to be ‘enforced’ at the global level. To be sure, cosmopolitans 
hardly ever emphasize the rightful enforceability of justice, but this is probably 
because they take it for granted. A supporter of a global version of the difference 
principle would likely answer the question ‘Should the citizens of the world be taxed 
in accordance with the demands of Rawlsian justice?’ in the affirmative. Similarly, a 
supporter of global luck equality or some other cosmopolitan view would presumably 
welcome the imposition of a global institutional system which realizes the demands of 
justice as she conceives of them. 
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 Despite its seemingly straightforward nature as a view about enforceable 
morality, cosmopolitanism hides a deeply unpalatable implication. If, ex hypothesi, it 
were possible to realize global equality only by instituting a global dictatorship of the 
enlightened, then cosmopolitan justice would require instituting it. From a 
cosmopolitan perspective, the task of global institutions is to implement an 
independent conception of egalitarian justice. In choosing institutions, then, the 
cosmopolitan will have to look at which are the ones most likely to achieve this aim.  
If it turns out that a global oligarchy is better at doing the job than alternative 
institutional systems, then cosmopolitan justice would require establishing it.  
 I take it, many would feel that such a global oligarchy would fail to be true to 
the ideal of equal respect at the heart of the liberal understanding of justice.xv Perhaps 
the distributively egalitarian world envisaged in our example is not fully unjust, but it 
is not fully just either.  
 At this point, there are two responses available to cosmopolitans. First, they 
might reply that the envisaged global oligarchy would indeed be morally problematic, 
but not from the point of view of justice. Instead, a global oligarchy of the enlightened 
would breach some other value, such as legitimacy. To say that something is just, they 
might suggest, is not to say that it ought to be enforced. The permissibility of 
enforcement depends on principles being ‘validated’ through fair (e.g. democratic) 
decision procedures. A principle might truly indicate what justice requires, and yet 
not be permissibly enforceable. 
 It should be clear that this response, although not uncommon in discussions 
about justice, is not admissible from the perspective adopted here. To say that a 
certain principle X is not rightfully enforceable is to say that it is not a principle of 
justice. And it would be somewhat unfair to take cosmopolitans not to put forward 
theories of global justice in this stronger sense. After all, cosmopolitans often see 
themselves as extending the principles of justice liberals defend at the domestic level 
to the global realm. Since domestic principles of justice are clearly marked by rightful 
enforceability, we can infer that global ones are too.xvi Moreover, even though, as I 
mentioned earlier, cosmopolitans do not dwell a great deal on the ‘enforceability’ 
aspect of justice, their insistence on justice as opposed to other kinds of moral 
concerns must be justified by appeal to justice’s specific features. Cosmopolitans do 
not seem to present their theories as setting out what ‘it may be nice for people to’, 
but rather as indicating ‘what, at any rate in principle, they can be made to do’ (again, 
to use Barry’s words). To that extent, they are concerned with justice qua enforceable 
morality.xvii 
 The second line of argument open to cosmopolitans consists in biting the 
bullet, by trying to explain away the anti-oligarchic intuition. After all, we know that 
an oligarchic global structure would in all likelihood not implement the global 
egalitarian ideal. Those in power could be easily corrupted, and this is why we resist 
the thought that elite-based global egalitarianism could be just. The intuition about the 
non-enforceability of global equality, cosmopolitans might therefore suggest, stems 
from our reluctance to accept the empirical, rather than the conceptual, possibility of 
the relevant counterfactual scenario (i.e. of a just global oligarchy). 
 Cosmopolitans by and large agree that, practically speaking, it would be a 
terrible idea to try to implement global justice oligarchically. Much more effective 
would be a global democratic (or quasi democratic) institutional arrangement. All 
they need to claim in order to vindicate their views about justice is that, in principle, a 
just world governed by a small elite is possible. Their argument goes as follows: 
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i. Justice (enforceable morality) is based on equal respect; 
ii. equal respect demands global equality; 
iii. if leaving a global elite in charge maximizes our chances of achieving global 
equality; 
 
 Conclusion: then global elite government is just (i.e. what justice demands). 
 
This argument seems sensible, and it is valid. In order to reject its conclusion, thereby 
showing that cosmopolitanism does not offer a plausible account of justice, we need 
to explain why it is unsound. Focusing on premise (i) or (iii) will not do. Premise (i) 
states the core commitment of liberalism, which I have taken for granted throughout 
the chapter. Premise (iii) is assumed for the sake of argument, and its empirical truth 
need not be established. Our target, then, will have to be premise (ii), namely the 
claim that equal respect demands global equality.  
 
4. Claim c: Cosmopolitan Justice and Rightful Enforceability—The Systematic 
Argument xviii 
Cosmopolitans endorse premise (ii), that equal respect, hence justice, demands global 
equality. Problematically, however, there is reasonable disagreement about this 
claim.xix That is, people who are genuinely committed to equal respect disagree about 
what it implies for our enforceable rights. It is crucial to note that, for their 
disagreement to count as reasonable, it must be limited in certain ways. For instance, 
the view (widely accepted in Saudi Arabia) that women, unlike men, should be 
prohibited from driving is unreasonable. How could equal respect for persons 
possibly ground such differential treatment between women and men? Similarly, a 
view which prohibited women or members of certain religious groups from voting or 
running for political office would also be deemed unreasonable. Once again, there is 
no plausible way of interpreting it as an operationalization of equal respect.  
 People who reasonably disagree about equal respect therefore agree on a set of 
fundamental entitlements constituting necessary conditions for a social system to 
qualify as just. Among them are the right to life, to freedom of movement, to access 
basic material resources, to equal treatment before the law and so forth. A social 
system within which these rights were not respected could not count as an 
instantiation of equal respect. Absent these protections, people can hardly be said to 
enjoy the social conditions to lead decent lives in pursuit of their ends and goals.  
 Despite their broad agreement on such ‘justice fundamentals’, people who 
take equal respect seriously disagree about (i) where exactly the boundaries of 
fundamental rights have to be drawn and (ii) what else equal respect demands. That 
is, they (partly) disagree about the conditions under which a social system qualifies 
as just or unjust.xx For instance, some think that, since equal respect demands 
respecting persons’ free choices, entitlements should be determined in accordance 
with the outcome of market transactions. Others believe that, since autonomy is of 
paramount importance, and neediness is the greatest threat to autonomy, resources 
ought to be given to those who need them most, no matter whether their need is self-
imposed or a matter of bad luck. Others still contend that resources should be 
distributed in an egalitarian manner. Within the latter group, in turn, there are 
advocates of strict equality, of luck-egalitarianism, of Rawlsian maximin and others. 
 If each person acted on the basis of her favoured criterion, the result would of 
course be far from what justice demands, leading to chaos and arbitrariness. What is 
more, to the extent that these different criteria are all at least in principle compatible 
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with equal respect for persons, no-one, including the liberal political philosopher, can 
claim the moral authority or expertise to impose her views on others who disagree 
with her. After all, they all hold reasonable interpretations of the demands of justice. 
Imposing one, reasonably contestable, account of what equal respect demands would 
be contrary to equal respect itself. How can a social system equally respect 
everyone’s autonomy if it selects a contested view of people’s entitlements and 
imposes it on dissenting parties?  
 Under these circumstances, equal respect for persons requires that enforceable 
morality be determined not by appeal to individuals’ contested accounts of rights, but 
by relying on what they hold in common. In other words, the demands of justice must 
be determined through ‘public reason’, corresponding to the area of overlap between 
different reasonable interpretations of equal respect. When it comes to establishing 
enforceable entitlements, we can therefore only assume the moral imperative to 
protect a set of fundamental rights. Beyond this threshold, equal respect itself 
prevents us from unilaterally establishing the conditions under which our social 
arrangements count as just or unjust.  
 Once this is appreciated, the cosmopolitan’s attempt to explain away our 
intuition about the non-enforceability of global equality can be defeated. Premise (ii) 
in the cosmopolitan argument—‘equal respect (hence justice) demands global 
equality’—is not satisfied in the world in which we live. Under circumstances of 
reasonable disagreement, we can only assume that equal respect demands honouring 
fundamental rights. For the purpose of setting out enforceable entitlements, we may 
not rely on reasonably contested views on justice in general, including any versions of 
global egalitarianism in particular.  
 In sum, since enforcing cosmopolitan global equality would be wrong, and 
since demands of justice are always rightfully enforceable (Claim a), 
cosmopolitanism does not set out genuine demands of justice.  
 
5. Between Cosmopolitanism and Anti-Cosmopolitanism 
So far, I have argued that global equality is not a demand of justice. Justice instead 
requires global sufficiency, in the form of respect for fundamental rights. This seems 
to suggest that, by taking the enforceability of justice seriously, we are quickly pushed 
into the anti-cosmopolitan camp.  
 This is only partly true. As I shall illustrate in what follows, taking the 
enforceability of justice seriously does not lead us straight to anti-cosmopolitanism, 
but rather, it points us in the direction of a view on global justice steering a middle 
course between global egalitarianism and global sufficientarianism. To make this 
point, I compare the upshot of my critique of cosmopolitanism with what is probably 
the most influential anti-cosmopolitan view to date: John Rawls’s. Focusing on 
Rawls’s outlook is particularly instructive not only because of its enduring influence 
on the debate on global justice, but also because it shares a number of concerns with 
my critique of cosmopolitanism.xxi 
 
5.1 My Critique of Cosmopolitanism and Rawls’s Law of Peoples 
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls sets out principles of international justice which are 
meant to take seriously the existence of disagreement between different political 
cultures in the global realm. As argued by Leif Wenar, Rawls’s concern with taking 
disagreement seriously may be most plausibly traced to his interest in the justification 
of coercion.xxii Already in Political Liberalism, Rawls attempts to elaborate an 
account of the ‘ideals and principles’ by appeal to which coercive political power can 
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be justified to all citizens, despite their holding different conceptions of the good. In 
The Law of Peoples, we may see Rawls as trying to answer a similar question, this 
time in relation to the international realm. Specifically, he considers what principles 
justify the use of coercion between peoples (rather than citizens) characterized by 
different political cultures (rather than different conceptions of the good). 
 The answer Rawls gives to the latter question includes: (i) respect for a 
relatively thin list of human rights, and (ii) duties of assistance between political 
communities.xxiii The first component of Rawls’s theory, respect for a thin list of 
human rights, allows Rawls to take international pluralism seriously. By excluding 
certain ‘liberal’ human rights from his list, he can declare what he calls ‘decent 
societies’ as members in good standing of a just international order. Decent societies 
differ from liberal ones in that they are hierarchically organized. Within decent 
societies, some discrimination on the basis of religion or social class may be allowed. 
However, those minorities who are discriminated against are treated ‘sufficiently 
well’ for their societies to be included in a just global order.xxiv  
 The second component, the duty of assistance, is meant to allow each society 
to obtain the necessary resources to become well-ordered (either liberal or decent). 
When societies are ‘burdened’ by unfavourable conditions, namely when they lack 
the social capital and economic means to constitute themselves into well-functioning 
polities, other peoples have duties to assist them. Unlike cosmopolitans, then, Rawls 
argues for a world in which all societies have ‘enough’, rather than a world in which 
all individuals have ‘the same’.xxv  
 As Wenar again explains, Rawls’s anti-egalitarian take on international justice 
is motivated by his concern with the justification of coercion to those who are subject 
to it. For such a justification to be successful, Rawls must draw its ‘building blocks’ 
from the international public culture. Since this is characterized by a concern not with 
global equality between individuals, but with respect for human rights and assistance 
between different countries, Rawls’s law of peoples articulates the latter moral 
concerns, not the former.xxvi Rawls’s principles of international justice, that is, are a 
product of global public reason.  
 So much for the description of Rawls’s position. Given that Rawls’s account 
of international justice seems animated by the same concerns as those I have raised in 
my critique of cosmopolitanism—the justification of coercion, the existence of 
reasonable disagreement, the need to rely on public reason—one may be tempted to 
conclude that, in fact, my critique of cosmopolitanism implicitly entails something 
like Rawls’s view. This would not be good news, however, since such a view is 
known to be affected by considerable difficulties.  
  Although Rawls is right to insist that a theory of global justice must focus on 
what entitlements are rightfully enforceable given reasonable disagreement, his 
account of international reasonable disagreement is unsatisfactory, insofar as it fails to 
be true to the fundamental commitments of liberalism. His inclusion of ‘decent 
hierarchical societies’ within a just global order, and his focus on the interests of 
peoples rather than on those of individuals, appear at odds with any plausible 
interpretation of persons’ moral equality—something Rawls’s critics have repeatedly 
pointed out.xxvii  
 Luckily, my critique of cosmopolitanism is not premised on an endorsement 
of Rawls’s somewhat ‘illiberal’ account of international reasonableness.xxviii Quite to 
the contrary, I have explicitly suggested that ‘reasonable’ means precisely compatible 
with the moral equality of persons, and that hierarchically organized social systems 
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would certainly not qualify as instantiating a reasonable account of justice in this 
sense.xxix (Recall the example of Saudi Arabia.)  
 My critique of cosmopolitanism therefore still retains a commitment to 
regarding individuals as fundamental units of moral concern. The justification of 
coercion, on my view, should not be carried out by relying on what happens to be 
agreed upon within the public international culture, but rather, by relying on the 
fundamental tenets of liberalism. If the international public culture deviates from 
those tenets, so much the worse for the public culture. The public reason at play in my 
argument is not public reason positively understood (i.e. what is de facto endorsed by 
the world at large) but public reason normatively understood (i.e. what anyone 
committed to equal respect ought to endorse).  
 
5.2 Towards Outcome Sufficiency and Procedural Equality 
A focus on public reason normatively understood implicitly points in the direction of 
an approach to global justice combining anti-cosmopolitan sufficiency with 
cosmopolitan equality. From the perspective of this approach, there is a set of 
requirements—fundamental rights—any social system must satisfy in order to count 
as minimally compatible with equal respect. These requirements, as we have seen, do 
not exhaust the demands of justice. However, since other requirements of justice fall 
within the area of reasonable disagreement, some might conclude that we should 
remain agnostic about them.  
 On reflection, this kind of agnosticism turns out to be incompatible with equal 
respect. This is because, by de facto instantiating a certain pattern of entitlements, any 
given state of the world corresponds to a particular, reasonably contested account of 
justice. Remaining silent about what justice demands (beyond fundamental rights) 
means letting arbitrary power dynamics decide on our behalf, which is clearly at odds 
with equal respect. The way decisions about ‘reasonably contested demands of 
justice’ are made must itself be an instantiation of equal respect.  
 This suggests that, under circumstances of reasonable disagreement, the 
demands of justice are partly substantive (to do with particular ‘outcomes’) and partly 
procedural (to do with the way in which certain outcomes are arrived at). Beyond 
fundamental rights, the only way to establish who is entitled to what compatibly with 
persons’ equal moral status is through the creation of fair decision-making 
mechanisms. If we cannot directly identify what equal respect requires at the level of 
substantive outcomes (beyond a certain threshold), we must adopt decision-making 
procedures where outcomes are arrived at in a way that expresses equal respect for all. 
The presence of reasonable disagreement about what equal respect demands in terms 
of end-state distribution of resources makes resort to egalitarian procedures a 
necessary demand of justice itself. This is the family of procedures broadly known as 
democratic.xxx 
 The upshot of this discussion is that a good liberal theory of global justice will 
have to comprise the following two components.xxxi 
 
A. Outcome component: Establishes a set of fundamental rights giving each 
individual the opportunity to lead a decent life pursuing her ends and goals.  
 
B. Procedural component: Establishes a set of fair procedures adjudicating 




The outcome component of justice, on this view, is structurally sufficientarian, just 
like anti-cosmopolitan principles. A just global order is one in which each individual 
has the opportunity to lead a decent life, but this does not entail that individuals’ life 
prospects or resource endowments should be equal.  
 The procedural component, on the other hand, moves away from some of the 
most prominent versions of anti-cosmopolitanism, in that it requires egalitarian forms 
of political organization. These forms of political organization might of course vary, 
but we can certainly assume that they will have to be broadly democratic, by 
protecting freedom of thought, speech and association, and by giving each individual 
a roughly equal say in the political decision-making process. Only a system so 
designed could plausibly express equal respect for all.  
 This moves us away from Rawlsian anti-cosmopolitanism in two respects. 
First, it rules out the possibility of a just world order inhabited by hierarchical 
societies, since, from the liberal perspective proposed here, procedural equality is a 
sine-qua-non of justice. Second, it calls for the establishment of egalitarian procedures 
at the global level, capable of adjudicating between different accounts of what 
justice—beyond respect for a set of fundamental outcome and procedural rights—
requires. The outcome of such procedures will then be enforceable, but its 
enforceability will not rest on its correspondence with an independent account of 
justice, but rather on its procedural pedigree. For example, if cosmopolitan global 
equality were the outcome, its enforceability would rest on it being selected through a 
certain procedure, not on its independent moral correctness.  
 Offering a complete picture of what a just world, according to this account, 
would look like goes well beyond the scope of this chapter. Obviously, the existing 
world falls short of this ideal, and considerable institution-building and reform would 
be necessary in order to bring it closer to it. The important point, for present purposes, 
is that if justice is grounded in equal respect for persons qua autonomous agents, and 
if principles of justice are always rightfully enforceable, then we have some reason to 
believe that the integrated—substantive cum procedural—approach I have sketched is 
superior to both cosmopolitanism and its rivals’ views.xxxii 
 
6. Would Cosmopolitans Really Disagree? 
Before concluding, let me consider an objection cosmopolitans are likely to raise. 
Succinctly stated, the objection claims that the integrated—outcome sufficientarian 
and procedurally egalitarian—approach I have proposed is one cosmopolitans 
themselves already endorse. This being the case, the positive lessons to learn from my 
discussion are trivial, and my critique of cosmopolitanism unfair.  
 To see why this objection is well-grounded, consider an argument recently put 
forward by a prominent cosmopolitan theorist, often classified as a ‘radical’ 
proponent of global equality: Simon Caney.xxxiii Caney argues that cosmopolitan 
institutional design requires:  
 
suprastate institutions charged with protecting persons’ fundamental rights (including, 
for example, their interest in security, a healthy environment, and not suffering from 
poverty) and mediating fairly between competing ideals of world order.xxxiv  
 
To say that this picture of a just cosmopolitan world resembles the one I have 
sketched in the previous section would be an understatement. In fact, the similarities 
between Caney’s position and mine become even more striking if we look at the 
argument he offers in support of his conclusion.  
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 First, he suggests that, in order to protect people’s most fundamental rights, 
global institution-building is needed. Without powerful global institutions, it would be 
impossible to solve the collective-action problems which characterize our globalized 
world and which constantly put at risk the well-being of its inhabitants. In addition, 
however, Caney takes notice of the fact that ‘above a certain basic minimum, there is 
profound disagreement about global distributive justice among reasonable and 
reflective persons.’xxxv He then goes on to argue that coercively imposing one 
particular account of justice on the world at large would be disrespectful towards 
those who reasonably disagree with it. Consequently, he calls for the need of fair 
adjudication processes allowing us to arbitrate between different accounts of 
justice.xxxvi  
 What is interesting about Caney’s view is not only its defence of fundamental 
rights and fair decision procedures at the global level, but the very grounds on which 
such defence is carried out. Caney does not consider fair decision-making as a means 
to justice. Rather, he believes that it has intrinsic value, grounded in equal respect. 
The idea is not that fair decision procedures are likeliest to bring about a given ideal 
of justice, but rather that no such given ideal can be legitimately assumed.   
 In light of this, it would be easy to conclude that my critique of 
cosmopolitanism is based on a misunderstanding. Cosmopolitans defend precisely the 
view I myself am sympathetic to, they just have not made it sufficiently explicit. 
(Caney being an exception in this respect.) What to say in defence of my argument?
 My first reaction is to point out that cosmopolitans cannot ‘have their cake and 
eat it’. If they do indeed agree with me that global justice has both an outcome and a 
procedural dimension (and hence that global equality per se is not a demand of 
justice), then they need to abandon their claim that global equality is a demand of 
justice.xxxvii Since the latter is widely regarded as the central commitment of a 
cosmopolitan moral outlook, at the very least, cosmopolitans are guilty of false 
advertizing.  
 To this, cosmopolitans might reply that while, like me, they endorse 
fundamental rights and fair procedures, unlike me, they do not think of them in terms 
of justice. Instead, they consider them as ‘principles of global governance’ or ‘global 
institution building’. The success of this response rests on cosmopolitans’ ability to 
vindicate the distinction between (non-enforceable) justice and (enforceable) global 
governance. This is a difficult task. If justice is not about those rights which may be 
legitimately enforced, what is it about? If justice does not set out the principles which 
should govern coercive institutions, then what exactly is its role within morality?  
 Most importantly, if justice is not about enforceable morality, we must infer 
that cosmopolitans’ work on ‘global distributive justice’ sets out what people ought to 
do in their private capacities. Instead of global justice, cosmopolitans are talking 
about global assistance or charity. Surely, as I already pointed out earlier in my 
discussion, this would be an uncharitable interpretation of cosmopolitans’ aims. 
Moreover, both cosmopolitan ‘principles of institutional design’ and cosmopolitan 
‘principles of justice’ are grounded in the liberal commitment to the moral equality of 
persons, and it would seem odd to believe that persons’ moral equality demands both 
global outcome equality and something which may well conflict with global outcome 
equality (namely global fair decision-making).  
 Faced with these claims, cosmopolitans might want to counter that the 
relevant distinction to be drawn is not one between ‘global governance’ and ‘global 
justice’, but rather one between two different dimensions of justice: political and 
distributive.xxxviii  Their global egalitarianism only offers a ‘partial’ theory of justice, 
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focusing on the distributive dimension. An overall theory of global justice would 
instead require both a distributive component and a political (procedural) one, as well 
as an account of how the two should be traded-off against one another.  
 This is a plausible response, yet one that considerably downsizes the 
ambitions of cosmopolitan theorizing. This is because, until cosmopolitans establish 
the relevant trade-off between the ‘distributive’ and ‘political’ dimensions of justice, 
they cannot, strictly speaking, tell us what global justice demands. If some of their 
distributive principles (those that go beyond sufficiency) turn out not to be rightfully 
enforceable, then, as I have argued all along, those principles do not count as 
principles of justice proper. At most, they are candidate inputs within fair decision-
making procedures the output of which will tell us what justice demands. Given the 
centrality that fair procedures would have in an overall account of cosmopolitan 
justice so conceived, it is surprising that cosmopolitans have given comparatively 
little attention to them. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that cosmopolitan moral principles are not appropriately 
regarded as principles of justice because they are not rightfully enforceable. Part of 
the point of my argument has been to bring some conceptual discipline to debates in 
international normative theory. These debates often revolve around questions of 
‘justice’, without giving sufficient attention to the special features of justice as a 
distinctive kind of moral concern. 
 In addition, I have shown that taking the enforceability of justice seriously 
points us in the direction of an approach to global justice which steers a middle course 
between cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolitanism. This approach gives prominence 
not only to distributive outcomes, but also to the justice-based value of procedures, 
thus bringing discussions about global justice closer to discussions about global 
democracy.xxxix My critique of cosmopolitanism implicitly contains an invitation to 
re-orient the debate on global justice, giving greater prominence to procedural 
considerations within it. Whether such re-orientation is worthwhile still remains to be 
seen. In this chapter, I hope to have provided at least some initial reasons for 
believing that it is. 
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